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EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ADOPTION &
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS: ACTING IN A
CHILD'S BEST INTEREST
Casey Martin*
"[The] best interest of the child is an elusive guideline that
belies rigid definition. Its purpose is to maximize a child's
opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a couple is unable to conceive a child, one partner
is artificially inseminated or goes through a scientific procedure
to bear the child, but afterward the other partner is not allowed
to adopt the child. 2 Consider whether the fact that the couple is
heterosexual is surprising; and whether it would be surprising if
it were a homosexual couple.
Regardless of the sexual orientation of the couple involved,
the inability to adopt is devastating for both the children and the
parents.3 The most dramatic illustration of the problem is when
a biological parent dies and the living partner does not have le-
gal custody of the children.4 In this situation, the children may
then be removed from the only home that they have ever
known.5 This surely would not "maximize a child's opportunity
to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult."6
* Senior Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 43. J.D. Candi-
date, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Occidental College.
1. Adoption of Michelle T., 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
2. See Domestic Partnerships, Assem. Bill 25, 2001-2002 Legis. Sess. §§ 5-6 (Cal.
2001) [hereinafter AB-25] (codified at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9000, 9002 (2001)). Un-
married couples or unregistered couples cannot adopt children through second
parent adoption or stepparent adoption. See id.
3. See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d
107 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
4. See Bob Egelko, Same-Sex Adoption Procedure Nullified, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 27,
2001, at All.
5. See id.
6. Adoption of Michelle T., 117 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
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Recognizing the importance of focusing on the best interest
of the children, the California Legislature enacted a new law that
allows registered domestic partners to adopt their partner's
children.7 Although this legislation is at once ground breaking
and historic, it does not solve all the problems that non-
conventional adoptive families face in California. 8 The legisla-
ture cannot address the ever-changing needs of non-traditional
families, due to the rate of social and technological innovation.9
Only the judiciary has the capacity to tailor solutions to individ-
ual families in a timely manner. 10
This comment discusses the legal justifications for allowing
the judiciary to employ declaratory judgment proceedings to
address the concerns of non-conventional adoptive families."
The comment first considers various aspects of adoption law
and second parent adoption law germane to this discussion.1 2
Next, it focuses on the types of adoptive families that current
law does not adequately provide for.13 It then analyzes the con-
stitutionality of declaratory judgment in the context of adoption
law.14 Finally, the comment proposes that declaratory judg-
ments should be used as an additional means of providing for
all types of adoptive families.15
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Second Parent Adoptions in California
Of the three forms of adoption available in California prior
to the legislature's passage of Assembly Bill 25, only one form-
stepparent adoption-allowed a birth parent's 16 spouse to adopt a
7. See AB-25 supra note 2.
8. See AB-25, supra note 2 (allowing only registered domestic partners to
adopt).
9. See Christopher Heredia, Midgen to Offer Gay-Adoption Bill, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 30, 2001, at A15.
10. See In re Marriage of Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1086-90 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
In this case, the court employed a declaratory judgment (though unreported) to es-
tablish a child's parentage before birth. See id.
11. "Non-conventional" is used in this comment to refer to an unmarried het-
erosexual couple or an unregistered domestic partnership.
12. See discussion infra Part II.A.
13. See discussion infra Part II.C.
14. See discussion infra Parts II.E., IV.B.
15. See discussion infra Part V.
16. "Birth parent" in this context could be either a biological mother or a bio-
logical father, although more often it is a biological mother.
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child while maintaining the birth parent's rights in connection
with the child.17 The more traditional forms of agency and inde-
pendent adoption required a complete relinquishment of rights
by the birth parent before any type of adoption could take
place.18 Because a stepparent could adopt his or her partner's
children without requiring the spouse to surrender parental
rights,19 stepparent adoption was a popular option for both tra-
ditional and non-traditional couples.20 Stepparent adoption re-
quires one biological parent to give up parental rights, in order
to ensure that the child has only two legal parents. Non-
traditional unmarried couples frequently refer to stepparent
adoption as "second parent adoption."21 Prior to discussing sec-
ond parent adoption, this comment explains each of California's
traditional forms of adoption.
1. Types of Adoption Allowed in California
The first type of traditional adoption, agency adoption,22 re-
quires birth parents to surrender their parental rights over the
child to a licensed adoption agency or the Department of Social
Services.23 Once parental rights are surrendered, so too are the
parental responsibilities, and the agency or the Department of
Social Services has control of the child until adoption.24
When a couple adopts a child, the agency gives them all the
rights and responsibilities associated with the child, and the
rights of the birth parents terminate.25 A birth parent may spec-
ify to the agency that he or she would like certain people to
adopt the child, and the agency usually abides by the parent's
request.26 However, if parents different from those specifically
designated by the birth parent adopt the child, then the birth
parent's parental rights do not expire.27 For example, a mother
who gave her child to an adoption agency would relinquish her
17. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9000, 9003(a), 9005(a) (Deering 1996 & Supp. 2002).
18. See id. § 8700.
19. See Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples in
a Brave New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 5-6 (1999).
20. See id.
21. Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian Centered Critique of Second Parent Adoptions, 14
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 17, 22-27 (1999).
22. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700 (Deering Supp. 2002).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8616, 8617, 8700 (West 2001).
26. See id. § 8700(0.
27. See id.
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rights until the agency adopted her child. If she specified that
she wanted her child placed with a particular family, and the
agency placed the child with that family, then the mother and
the agency relinquish parental rights to the adoptive parents.
The second form of traditional adoption, independent adop-
tion,28 is different from agency adoption in that the birth parents
choose the potential adoptive parents without agency interven-
tion.29 The birth parents must then agree to the adoption by
signing an adoption placement agreement. 30 After a court ap-
proves the agreement, the birth parents relinquish all rights to
the child, giving these rights directly to the adoptive parents.
31
An example of independent adoption includes a biological
mother who gave her child up for adoption by neighbors or
people that she knew by signing an adoption agreement. After
ninety days, the adoptive parents have full parental rights to the
child and the biological mother's rights to the child terminate.
The third form of adoption, stepparent adoption,32 enables
the non-biological husband or wife of the birth parent to petition
the court to adopt the child, pending the permission of one or
both birth parents.33 The primary difference between stepparent
adoption and the other traditional forms of adoption is that the
birth parent or legal parent in a stepparent adoption does not
give up his or her rights to, and responsibilities for, the child.
34
For example, if a child's stepfather wanted to adopt her, he
could do so without causing his wife, the child's mother, to re-
linquish any parental rights.35
Second parent adoption is a modification of stepparent
adoption that allows an unmarried partner to adopt the legal or
biological child of the other partner. 36 Like stepparent adoption,
the birth parent of the child retains his or her rights while at the
same time sharing them equally with his or her partner or
spouse.37 As with other forms of adoption, there may be only
28. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8800 (West 1999).
29. See id. §§ 8524, 8801.
30. See id. § 8801.3(b)-(c).
31. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8548, 9004 (West 2001).
32. See id. § 9000.
33. See id.
34. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
35. This could only occur if the child's biological father or previous father had
either died or given up all parental rights to the child. See id.
36. See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 22-27.
37. See Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107.
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two legal parents.38 When the adoption takes place, even if one
parent retains parental rights, the other parent's rights must be
extinguished. 39 For example, if a stepfather wanted to adopt his
wife's child, then the rights of the child's biological father must
first be terminated.40
Until the mid to late eighties, unmarried and same-sex cou-
ples did not have the option of second parent adoption.41 How-
ever, in the early nineties, courts began to address the issue. In
1992, California's Third District Appellate Court addressed
same-sex second parent adoption for the first time.42
California and sixteen other states allow second parent
adoption, while three states have expressly prohibit the proce-
dure.43 In many of the remaining states, there is no precedent
directly on point,44 and the availability of second parent adop-
tions depends on each court's liberal or conservative interpreta-
tion of the state adoption statute.45
2. Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego County46 and
Its Effect on Second Parent Adoptions in California
Prior to the enactment of AB-25 and the California Court of
Appeals decision in Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego,47
second parent adoption in California had two different types.48
The first type was a modified independent adoption, in which
the birth parent agreed to the adoption but intended to retain
parental rights.49 The second type was an agency adoption, in
which the birth parent gave up custody rights to the adoption
agency, and specifically appointed him or herself and his or her
partner as the adoptive parents.5 0
Sharon involved an attempt at modified independent adop-
38. See Doskow, supra note 19, at 5-7.
39. See id.
40. See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 22-27.
41. See Doskow, supra note 19, at 5-7.
42. See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 112-13.
49. See id.
50. The Sharon court declined to rule on this second type of partner adoption,
and as a result, pre-AB-25 second parent adoptions of this sort may still be valid.
See id.
2003]
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tion by a same-sex couple.51 The biological mother, Sharon
Silverstein, agreed to a second parent adoption of her children
by her partner Annette Friskopp when the partners were living
together and maintained a relationship.5 2 After the relationship
deteriorated but before the adoption was final, Silverstein re-
scinded permission for Friskopp to adopt her two children,
prompting Silverstein to take the matter to court.53
Prior to Sharon, various courts, along with the Department
of Social Services, had liberally interpreted adoption statutes
and permitted second parent adoptions.54 The trial court fol-
lowed this precedent and allowed the adoption proceedings to
continue as part of a "'modified' independent adoption, a prac-
tice developed by the Department of Social Services."55 How-
ever, the court of appeals expressly repudiated this practice in
their decision.56
The court of appeals decision stated that there are only three
enforceable methods of adoption in the state of California: ad-
ministrative adoption, independent adoption, and stepparent
adoption.57 Since same-sex partners are unable to marry, the de-
cision precluded Sharon and Friskopp from using either step-
parent adoption or modified independent adoption to adopt
their partner's children.58
The court declined to allow Sharon-type adoptions because
it could not "construe past legislative inaction as evidence of the
Legislature's approval of the use of modified independent adop-
tion... [and] reject[ed] the view that the [1]egislature silently
enacts major social policy." 59 The court of appeals interpreted
the 1997-1998 California legislature's failure to adopt a second
parent adoption bill as "a clear indication that the [L]egislature
did not previously authorize the accomplishment of second par-
51. See id. at 107.
52. See Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E. 2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption
of Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993); In re Adoption of
Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1992); Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271
(Vt. 1993). But see Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327 (Ohio Ct.
App.); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).
55. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111-14.
56. See id. at 107.
57. See id. at 111. Administrative adoption differs from agency adoption I that
it encapsulates any type of government entity or agency.
58. See id. at 111-12.
59. Id. at 113-14.
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ent adoptions." 60 Since Silverstein neither relinquished her
rights to her children nor allowed a "spouse" to adopt them,
Silverstein's biological tie to her children prevailed in the case,
and she retained custody of her children.61
B. AB-25 and the Resurrection of Second Parent Adoption in
California
In 2000, California created a registry for domestic partners
within the state. 62 The legislature created this registry through
Senate Bill 75, which gave domestic partners visitation rights in
hospitals and dependents of some state government employees
health coverage.63 On the heels of this legislation, California
voters in the year 2000 approved the "protection of marriage ini-
tiative," also known as Proposition 22.64 Proposition 22 defined
marriage as a union achievable only between a man and a
woman.65 Despite Proposition 22, the California legislature fol-
lowed the lead of cities such as Los Angeles, Oakland, and San
Francisco, and corporations such as Walt Disney, Ford Motor,
and IBM, and passed the progressive domestic partner legisla-
tion California AB-25. 66
Effective January 1, 2002, AB-25 expanded upon Senate Bill
75 and added significant supplemental legal benefits for domes-
tic partners. 67 The legislation grants domestic or same-sex part-
ners the right to stepparent adoption subject to the approval of a
family court and any other individual with parental rights over
the child.68 AB-25 also amends the Family Code by defining a
domestic partnership as "two adults who have chosen to share
one another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship of
mutual caring."69 This definition includes same-sex couples, as
well as individuals over the age of sixty-two. 70 One of the new
rights afforded to these domestic partners is the aforementioned
60. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
61. See id. at 111-12.
62. See Renee M. Scire & Christopher A. Raimondi, Employment Benefits: Will
Your Significant Other Be Covered?, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 357, 364-65 (2000).
63. See id.
64. See Jennifer Warren, Bill Expanding Domestic Partners' Rights Signed, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at B6.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See AB-25, supra note 2.
68. See id.
69. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (2001).
70. See id.
2003]
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right to stepparent adoption, codified in section 5 of AB-25:
Section 9000 of the California Family Code is amended to
read: (a) a stepparent desiring to adopt a child of the step-
parent's spouse may for that purpose file a petition in the
county in which the petitioner resides. (b) a domestic part-
ner, as defined in Section 297, desiring to adopt a child of his
or her domestic partner may for that purpose file a petition
in the county in which the petitioner resides. 71
Under AB-25, a Sharon-type second parent adoption is valid,
as it gives a domestic partner the ability to adopt his or her part-
ner's child through a variation of traditional stepparent adop-
tion.72 Although AB-25 is both ground-breaking and historic, it
does not solve all of the problems facing non-traditional couples
trying to adopt or give birth to children.73
One unresolved problem in the wake of AB-25 is the possi-
ble invalidation of Sharon-type second parent adoptions that
took effect before January 1, 2001. 74 Although same-sex adop-
tive parents have the option of adopting their partner's child
through second parent adoption after AB-25,75 the bill only cov-
ers registered domestic partners currently residing in Califor-
nia.76 It does not cover families that have, since the adoption,
broken up or moved out of state, nor would it apply if the bio-
logical parent has died and the non-biological parent wants to
adopt the child.77 These families may or may not be protected
by the state adoption code, which says that adoptions lasting
longer than twelve months are protected from challenge. 78
C. Remaining Questions Under AB-25
Unless the decision in the Sharon case is overruled, AB-25
may not address the concerns of many couples who, since
adopting their children, have moved out of state, broken up, or
71. Id. § 9000.
72. See id.
73. See Bill Ainsworth, Governor Signs Measure Giving New Rights to Domestic
Partners, S.D. UNION TRIB., Oct. 15, 2001, at Al.
74. See Bob Egelko, Same-Sex Adoption Procedure Nullified, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 27,
2001, at All.
75. See AB-25, supra note 2.
76. See id.
77. See Warren, supra note 64.
78. See Greg Mitchell, Court of Appeal Dumps Second Parent Adoption, THE
RECORDER, Oct. 29, 2001, at 3.
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if the biological parent has died.79 Even though the state adop-
tion code says that adoptions longer than twelve months are
immune from challenge, 0 if these families are taken to court,
they might face significant problems with the validity of the
adoption of their children.81
Potential parents cannot employ AB-25 unless they want to
get married or register as domestic partners.8 2 This limitation is
problematic because some people may want to refrain from get-
ting married or registering as partners.83 In addition, AB-25
simply does not address the concerns of families that wish to
recognize more than two parents, as it retains the tradition of
recognizing just two legal parents.84
1. AB-25 and Parents Aho Adopted Their Children After the
Ruling in Sharon
According to division 13 of the California Family Code, 85 ac-
tions to vacate adoptions must take place within one year of the
adoption or they are prohibited by the statute of limitations.86
The California legislature intended adoptions to become final
within this fixed period to prevent emotional harm to the child.87
"Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, and are based in
part upon the proposition that persons who sleep upon their
rights may lose them."88 "We can think of no situation to which
the principle is more applicable than that of natural parents who
... wait for more than five years to attack an adoption ... " 89
Parents who adopted their children within a year after the
decision in Sharon are unlikely to face litigation; however, ques-
tions of fraud could bring them to court.90 Parents who have not
finalized their adoption and, like the couple in Sharon cannot
make an agreement, might also face litigation.91 Families facing
79. See Egelko, supra note 74.
80. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9102 (2001).
81. See id.
82. See id. § 297.
83. See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 22-27.
84. See AB-25, supra note 2.
85. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9102 (2001).
86. See id.
87. The state gives only actions based on fraud an additional three years in
which to vacate an adoption. See id.
88. See id. § 9102.
89. See Walter v. August, 8 Cal. Rptr. 778, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
90. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9012.
91. See Warren, supra note 64.
2003]
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the death of a biological parent, or those who have since moved
out of state, may also find themselves embroiled in litigation.92
These families need to have stability that the current legal sys-
tem is incapable of providing. 93
2. Addressing the Concerns of People Who May Not Want to
Marry or Become Domestic Partners, but Who Would Still
Like to Adopt Under AB-25
Marriage or domestic partnership may not address all cir-
cumstances in which people wish to raise children.94 AB-25 ad-
dresses many of the concerns of unequal treatment for homo-
sexual partners wishing to adopt, but it does not necessarily
address the needs of non-traditional homosexual or heterosexual
couples wishing to pursue traditional or second parent adop-
tion.95 Many individuals, heterosexual and homosexual alike,
would prefer to raise their children outside the legal institutions
of marriage or partnership. 96 Children might find themselves
excluded from adoption due to the categorization of their poten-
tial adoptive parents (or second parents) as unfit due to their
lack of a recognized legal relationship. 97
California courts traditionally have not allowed two un-
married, non-legally bound individuals to adopt a child.98
However, single individuals have the ability to adopt a child,99
and there is little, if any evidence that their children are ad-
versely affected by their single marital status. 100 It thus makes
little sense to preclude individuals who are in a committed rela-
tionship, 101 albeit without legal recognition, from adopting a
92. See id.
93. See discussion infra Part V.
94. See Lisa M. Pooley, Heterosexism and Children's Best Interests: Conflicting Con-
cepts in Nancy S. v. Michele G., 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 477,477-81 (1993).
95. Here, non-traditional is defined as non-married heterosexual partners, non-
registered domestic partners, and any additional type of partnership not currently
recognized by California law.
96. See Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians
and Gay Men and the Intra Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567,
567-69 (1994).
97. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
98. See id.
99. "A man who has neither legally married nor attempted to legally marry the
mother of his child cannot become a presumed father unless he both 'receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his minor child."' Adoption
of Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th 1043, 1048 (1995).
100. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714 (2001).
101. A review of research on children adopted by single, unmarried parents
[Vol. 43
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child.102 In fact, research indicates that children who grow up in
"alternative" households grow up equally as "well-adjusted" as
those raised in traditional, heterosexual married households.10 3
As the number of fit104 parents allowed to adopt increases, so
does the benefit to children 05 and to society at large.10 6
D. AB-25, Scientific Advances, and Changing Definitions of Legal
Parentage
With the advent of new reproductive technologies, many
children are born with more than two biological parents.10 7 Be-
cause the Constitution grants every person a fundamental right
to "beget" a child,108 the legal system must keep pace with ge-
netic scientific innovation' 09 and find a way to recognize the best
interest of both the parents and children.
Despite countless changes in traditional family dynamics,
the state of California continues to recognize only the possibility
of two legal parents in traditional adoptions. 0 As an offshoot of
traditional adoption, second parent adoption also acknowledges
only two legal parents for a child."' AB-25 and second parent
adoption fail to dismiss the concerns of those parents and chil-
dren who could benefit by the recognition of more than two le-
gal or biological parents.112
Scientific procedures have made it possible for a child to
seems to indicate that children that are adopted by single parents develop very
well. See Vic Groze, Adoption and Single Parents: A Review, 70 CHILD WELFARE 321,
329-30 (1991).
102. Assuming that the children do not have special needs, allowing more chil-
dren to be adopted would seem to be in the best interests of all involved. See id. at
330.
103. See Robert L. Barret & Bryan E. Robinson, Gay Dads, in REDEFINING FAMI-
LIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT 157-68 (Adele E. Gottfried &
Allen W. Gottfried eds., 1994). There is generally no difference between the de-
velopment of children with gay parents and children of heterosexual parents. See
id.
104. This assumes that "fit parents" includes non-traditional couples, traditional
couples, and single heterosexual and homosexual parents.
105. See Pooley, supra note 94, at 477-78.
106. See Warren, supra note 64.
107. See Kyle C. Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implications of Tri-
Gametic In Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 431, 432-40 (1999).
108. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972).
109. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 895 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
110. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
111. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
112. See id.
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have six possible biological parents,113 not including potential
adoptive parents. In this environment of scientific and social
advances, working in the "best interest" 114 of the child might ne-
cessitate the recognition of more than two legal parents.
In a case where several adverse interested parties lay claim
to a child as "parents," the possibility of harm to the child is
great. If having more than two legal parents would enable a
child to live in a more secure environment, then the law should
adapt accordingly. Uncertainty in legal parentage could also
have disastrous consequences for a child both emotionally and
physically.115 In facing societal and scientific advances in par-
enthood, the legislature and the courts must avoid allowing
years of a child's fate to hang in a court-imposed limbo.116
Scientific and social innovations are testing the age-old
model of marriage as the vehicle for determining parenthood. 117
In vitro fertilization allows a woman to give birth to a child to
whom she is genetically unrelated.118 A woman may also em-
ploy techniques such as artificial insemination or assisted repro-
duction in order to give birth.1 19 These techniques allow a cou-
ple that is unable to bear children to produce a child using the
biological material or entire bodies of other people.1 20
Until 1994, California law provided that motherhood could
only be determined through a woman "having given birth to the
child."12 1 This definition proved insufficient to address the in-
creasing number of technological advances present in society.122
The case of In re Baby M123 was the first to address the disparity
between the law and technological advances.1 24
113. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 284 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998). Several sources allude to who the "six parents" include, but I found no clear-
cut list.
114. See Adoption of Michelle T., 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)
(presenting an articulation of the "best interests" standard in placing a child).
115. See June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle, 39 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1091, 1093-98 (1999).
116. See id. at 1093.
117. See id. at 1092-94.
118. See Janet Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the
Law, 23 VT. L. REV. 225, 225-30 (1998).
119. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach
to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 848 (2000).
120. See id.
121. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (1994).
122. See Garrison, supra note 119.
123. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1998).
124. See id. at 1227-32.
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The New Jersey case In re Baby M questioned the parentage
of a child carried by a surrogate mother.125 When the surrogate
asserted a claim to the child she bore, the biological parents took
the issue to court and asked for enforcement of the surrogacy
agreement.126 The surrogacy agreement required the surrogate
mother to relinquish all claims to the child.127 The New Jersey
Supreme Court declared the surrogate contract void as against
public policy, and employed the best interest of the child test in
deciding with whom the court should place the child. 128 The
best interest standard is a familiar family law determination that
includes: "stability, love, family happiness, tolerance, and ulti-
mately support of independence."1 29 Considering all of these
factors, the court granted custody to the biological parents, and
granted visitation rights to the surrogate mother.1 30
Johnson v. Calvert131 presented California courts with surro-
gacy issues analogous to those seen in In re Baby M.132 Despite
the similarities between the two cases, the California appellate
court reached an entirely different result than the New Jersey
Supreme Court. Calvert involved a couple who hired a surro-
gate mother to carry an embryo created from their genetic mate-
rial. However, "relations between [the Calverts and the surro-
gate mother] deteriorated" before the child was born and the
surrogate refused to give up the child to the Calverts.133 The
surrogate mother as well as Mr. and Mrs. Calvert petitioned for
custody of the child. The California Supreme Court concluded
that the Calverts were the child's legal parents.134 The court held
that even though the state will recognize both birth and biology
in the determination of motherhood, "when the two means do
not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the
child, that is she who intended to bring about the birth of a child
she intended to raise on her own is the natural mother under
California Law."1 35 When two mothers have a claim to a child
125. See id. at 1227.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1260.
130. See id. at 1227.
131. 5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993).
132. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1227.
133. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th at 87-88.
134. See id. at 93.
135. Id. at 93.
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biologically, California focuses on the intent test as opposed to
the best interest test employed by New Jersey in In re Baby M.136
The resolution of parentage in the California case In re Mar-
riage of Moschetta 137 proved more complex than the In re Baby
M or Calvert cases.138 In Moschetta, Cynthia and Robert Mo-
schetta entered into a contract with a surrogate who would bear
Robert's child through artificial insemination.139 Here, the court
of appeals did not apply the intent test to determine parentage,
but instead, employed the Baby M best interest test,140 remanding
the case to the trial court for determination of the best interest of
the child as a factual matter. 14'
Buzzanca v. Buzzanca142 involved a couple who, through a
fertility clinic, became parents to a child that bore no relation to
either one of them.143 The clinic used a donor sperm and egg
and a surrogate mother genetically unrelated to the child.144 The
couple divorced, and the husband claimed that there were no
children from the marriage because the child lacked a biological
relationship with the parents. 45 The California Court of Ap-
peals declared that "Jaycee never would have been born had not
Luanne and John both agreed to have a fertilized egg implanted
in a surrogate." 146 The appellate court observed that legal moth-
erhood could be established in ways other than acting as a sur-
rogate or contributing an egg. 47 The court held that the intent of
the parents to have a child prevailed, as the child's birth hinged
on the creation of "a medical procedure [that] was initiated and
consented to by intended parents." 48 Thus baby Jaycee, who the
Buzzancas intended to create, would not be relegated to orphan
status.149
136. See In re Baby M, 531 A.2d 1227, 1258-60; Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th at 84. An exam-
ple of having two biological mothers is when one woman has her egg implanted in
a surrogate.
137. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 893.
138. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1227; Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th at 851, 853-57.
139. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
140. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1258-60.
141. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900-03.
142. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
143. See id. at 281-82.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 280.
146. Id. at 282.
147. See id. at 282.
148. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
149. See id. at 285.
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Dunkin v. Boskey 150 represents perhaps one of the strangest
decisions in California case law concerning parentage. Dunkin
involved a man, Raymond, and a woman, Lisa, who entered into
a written agreement at a fertility clinic.151 Lisa agreed to have
Raymond act as the father of the child to be produced through
artificial insemination at the clinic.152 His name appeared as the
father on the birth certificate, and he cared for the child on a
daily basis for two years. 5 3 Despite this relationship, the court
of appeals dismissed Raymond's suit for custody when his rela-
tionship with Lisa deteriorated and she moved to Wisconsin.154
The court concluded that Raymond did not have standing to
bring the suit, due to the fact that he was neither an adoptive nor
biological father, and he was not married to the mother.155 Al-
though the court dismissed the action for custody, it allowed
Raymond to sue Lisa for breach of contract.156 After litigation,
the court ordered Lisa to pay Raymond restitution in the form of
the amount he spent in performance of their agreement. 5 7 Thus,
the court held that the agreement itself proved valid absent the
contractual provisions granting custody to Raymond. 158 Cali-
fornia law in this area remains perplexing, but one constant is
that "family law has consistently preferred the interests of chil-
dren and the public to those of parents and parent-claimants." 15 9
Neither AB-25160 nor traditional adoption law address the
concerns of all people who wish to adopt. Changing technology
and social values make it difficult to legislate for a child's best
interest in every circumstance. 16' "When the pace of change is
rapid and the impact of that change difficult to assess, it may be
preferable to deal with new legal issues on an ad hoc basis ini-
tially, deferring a more comprehensive approach until consensus
emerges on its scope and substance." 162 To deal with the revolu-
tionary advances in science and social attitudes toward child-
150. 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
151. See id. at 47-48.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 58-49.
154. See id. at 44-48.
155. See id. at 44-46.
156. See Dunkin, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44-46.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Garrison, supra note 119, at 844.
160. See discussion supra Part IIA-B.
161. See Garrison, supra note 119.
162. Id. at 852.
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bearing, courts have tolerated parents who file judicial actions
before rather than after birth in order to protect the interests of
their child.163
E. Declaratory Judgments in Adoption Cases
A declaratory judgment is a binding adjudication that estab-
lishes the rights and other legal relations of the parties without
providing for or ordering enforcement.164 Declaratory judg-
ments could be used to address the needs of those who wish to
adopt outside "normal adoption proceedings."
165
In California, Litowitz v. Litowitz166 exemplifies the use of the
procedure to enable the law to work in the best interest of the
child.167 In Litowitz, the couple arranged for a surrogate mother
to bear a child created from a donated egg and the husband's
sperm.168 During the surrogate's pregnancy, the Litowitzes re-
ceived a California court order that declared them the legal par-
ents of the child that the surrogate carried. 169 If they had not re-
ceived the declaratory order, then Mr. Litowitz would still be
considered both the genetic and intentional father of the child,
but the intended mother, Becky Litowitz, would have no bio-
logical or legal connection to the child.170 This situation could
place her status as the mother of the child in doubt, even if she
lived with the child for a long period of time. 171 The pre-birth
declaratory judgment of parenthood in this case precluded this
worry and extinguished the possibility of legal battling.
172
1. The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 authorizes federal
courts to interpret brand new laws. 73 Under the Act, if a plain-
tiff can show that an actual controversy exists with a defendant
who was threatening enforcement, then she may be entitled to
163. See Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 84-101 (1993).
164. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (7th ed. 1999).
165. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
166. 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
167. See id. at 1089.
168. See id. at 1086-90.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1086-90.
172. See id. at 1086-87.
173. See Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 2201.13 (Law. Co-op.
1992).
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declaratory relief.174 According to the Act, a declaratory judg-
ment action is meant to permit a party to gain an "authoritative
judicial statement of legal relationships." 175 One intention be-
hind the Act was to spare citizens from the catch-22 of either
complying with an allegedly unconstitutional statute or violat-
ing the law and facing severe consequences if it were upheld. 176
However, a consistent application of the law of declaratory
judgments may be impossible, as the U.S. Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements on the Act have been inconsistent 77
The Court has repeatedly opined that nothing compels them
to entertain declaratory judgment actions, yet they almost al-
ways allow the actions in an administrative context.178 In Public
Affairs Associates v. Rickover,179 the Court stipulated that the Act
was an authorization, not a command. 180 Thus, it did not force
the courts to act, but rather gave the courts the ability to make a
declaration of rights using public interest as their guide.181
Assuming that a litigant is granted standing for her claim, a
declaratory judgment would be of minimal use if not given pre-
clusive effect.182 California has not yet tackled the problem of
the preclusive effect of declaratory judgments. Lortz v. Conne183
represents the only case wherein the courts have dealt with the
"preclusive effect of declaratory judgments in a subsequent ac-
tion."184 However, Lortz does not clearly delineate when an is-
sue is finally settled, thus leaving California law unresolved as
to issue preclusion, res judicata, and declaratory judgments.185
2. The Justiciability of Declaratory Judgments
Although the declaratory judgment in Litowitz provided in-
174. See id.
175. Id. § 2201.285.
176. See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the
Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction
While the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 531-32 (1989).
177. See id. at 533.
178. See Grace M. Giesel, The Expanded Discretion of Lower Courts to Regulate Ac-
cess to the Federal Courts After Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.: Declaratory Judgment Actions
and Implications Far Beyond, 33 HoUs. L. REV. 393, 395 (1996).
179. Public Affairs Assoc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111 (1962).
180. See id. at 111-17.
181. See Giesel, supra note 178, at 402.
182. See Elizabeth L. Hisserich, The Collision of Declaratory Judgments and Res Judi-
cata, 48 UCLA L. REV. 159, 160-62 (2000).
183. Lortz v. Connell, 78 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
184. Hisserich, supra note 182, at 175.
185. See Lortz, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 6; Hisserich, supra note 182, at 177-78.
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creased security for the child, extending the use of declaratory
judgments to other factual situations might present justiciability
problems. Any case brought by adoptive parents must necessar-
ily satisfy three justiciability requirements before it can be heard
on the merits: standing, mootness, and ripeness.186 To meet the
requirements of justiciability, the party must have standing to
bring a case and the issue may not be moot or ripe.187 It must
also be the type of question best answered by the courts rather
than the judiciary. 88
In order to invoke a court's jurisdiction for standing, a party
must demonstrate: (1) injury in fact, meaning an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, ac-
tual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;189 (2) that the
injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defen-
dant," 90 and (3) that there is a likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.191
The mootness doctrine limits the judiciary to resolving live
controversies between parties with individual rights at stake.192
This means that deciding a case after the dispute of the litigants
had ended would render that dispute "moot" and thus result in
a prohibited advisory opinion.193
Although the standing and mootness doctrines have histori-
cal precedent, ripeness is an innovation unique to the twentieth
century. 94 After the arrival of the Declaratory Judgment Act,195
the Supreme Court created the ripeness doctrine, in part, to de-
186. The modern court has treated all justiciability doctrines as "constitutional"
in two related senses. The first is textual: Article III's language extending "judicial
power" to "Cases" and "controversies" has been construed as limiting federal
courts to the adjudication of live disputes between parties with private interests at
stake. The second is structural: Judicial restraint preserves separation of powers by
avoiding interference with the democratic political branches, which alone must de-
ternine nearly all public law matters. See Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Justiciabilty and Sepa-
ration of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 455 (1996).
187. See id. at 455-65.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 472.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See Pushaw, supra note 186, at 490.
193. See Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L.
REV. 769, 770-80 (1998).
194. See Pushaw, supra note 186, at 493.
195. See Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (current
version at 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 2201-2202 (Law. Co-op. 2002)).
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cide when to issue declaratory relief.196 Ripeness entails post-
poning a decision until the factual and legal issues have fully
matured. 197 The problem of ripeness is two-fold in that the court
must evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision
as well as the hardship to the parties if court action is either
withheld or granted. 198
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The right to bear children is a right granted by the Constitu-
tion of the United States.199 For people unable or unwilling to
conceive through traditional methods, adoption and assisted re-
production are the only alternatives.200 It does not logically fol-
low that people should be prohibited from raising children
merely as a result of their non-traditional relationships or their
inability to procreate.
The passage of AB-25 marked the first expansion of Califor-
nia adoption law to protect same-sex adoptive families.20' How-
ever, AB-25 does not provide the kind of flexible remedy needed
to ensure that all fit parents who want to adopt are able to
adopt.202 If neither AB-25 nor traditional adoption laws address
the concerns of all adoptive families, the question is left as to
what will address these concerns.203 Two options are leaving the
decision to the legislature and allowing courts to adjudicate on a
case-by-case basis.204  If courts adjudicate case-by-case, they
must take care concerning how long they allow a child's fate to
hang in limbo.2 05 Another possibility is the use of declaratory
judgment actions by courts to solve the problems created by sci-
entific and social changes. However, in such actions courts must
be careful not to overstep their constitutionally granted author-
ity. On the other hand, the widened use of declaratory judg-
ments within adoption law could substantially decrease the
chances of a child's fate hanging in limbo as his or her case made
196. See Pushaw, supra note 186, at 494.
197. See id. at 493.
198. Id. at 496 (quoting Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)).
199. See Einstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972).
200. See Janet Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the
Law, 23 VT. L. REv. 225, 225-30 (1998).
201. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See Hisserich, supra note 182, at 160.
205. See id. at 160.
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its way through court. 206 Finding an adequate method to ad-
dress adoption concerns of both traditional and non-traditional
families is crucial to truly address the "best interest" of a child.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Adoption Concerns Not Addressed by AB-25
AB-25 does not address the concerns of many families in
California.207 First, AB-25 is an inadequate remedy for children
whose parents move or have moved out of state following
Sharon,208 or who suffer or have suffered the death of a biological
parent. Second, if a child's biological parent and stepparent fail
to finalize their second parent adoption before their separation,
as seen in Sharon, then the child's legal parentage becomes un-
certain.209 Third, AB-25 does not speak to the problems of non-
traditional couples, heterosexual and homosexual, who wish to
adopt.210 Finally, AB-25 does not address the situation in which
a child's best interest includes recognizing more than two legal
or biological parents.211
For same-sex parents who find themselves unsure of their
status in the wake of Sharon,212 the most logical reaction would
include registering under AB-25 as domestic partners and ob-
taining a second parent adoption. However, this process is not
an option for couples that have moved out of state.213 California
adoption law provides a contingency for these couples, in the
provision that absent fraud, adoptions may not be challenged af-
ter twelve months have elapsed since the proceedings.2 14 Other
states are required to honor California adoption decisions under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.215 Therefore, only adoptive families that conduct adoptions
in California find shelter under California law.216
If a child lost her biological parent, or if the adoption pro-
206. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
207. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
208. See Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (2001).
209. See id.
210. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
211. See id.
212. See Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111-13.
213. AB-25 only applies to California residents. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
214. See id.
215. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
216. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9000, 9002 (West Supp. 2002).
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ceedings were not finalized before Sharon,217 she might not find a
remedy under AB-25.218 The loss of the biological parent would
preclude the stepparent from giving the necessary consent, or
from filing for domestic partnership status under AB-25.219 Con-
sequently, the death of a partner would make it necessary for the
courts to grant special consideration to promote the interests of
fairness and justice.
Couples may have reasons for not getting married or regis-
tering as domestic partners. Many individuals may feel that the
institution of marriage is not something that they wish to par-
ticipate in. Their reasons could be as simple as having bad mari-
tal experiences in the past, or as complicated as feeling that the
institution of marriage is patriarchal. However, if two same-sex
partners choose not to register as domestic partners for personal
reasons, they will find themselves penalized within the adoption
system.220 Many same-sex partners might not wish to register
for fear of social condemnation or moral reproach. 221
However, there may be very real problems associated with
allowing partners who do not have a legal relationship to
adopt.222 If the relationship deteriorates between the partners, it
might be difficult for the court to decide where the child should
be placed. Additionally, courts might not feel comfortable with,
for social reasons, giving children to non-traditional couples. It
is easier to picture a court granting legal parentage to a married
heterosexual couple than to two domestic partners not regis-
tered under AB-25. Moreover, requiring marriage or registra-
tion for a domestic partnership might offer proof of a commit-
ment to childrearing. Opponents of second parent adoption
have proffered this same argument against domestic partners
raising children; these children have fared just as well as chil-
dren placed in traditional family environments.223
Although AB-25 represents a milestone, it does not provide
217. Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107, 111-
114 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
218. Sharon S. does not provide a remedy for people in this situation. See id. See
also AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
219. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
220. See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 17-27.
221. See id.
222. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
223. See Vic Groze, Adoption and Single Parents: A Review, 70 CHILD WELFARE 321,
329-30 (1991).
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for a child created by more than two parents.224 A child may be
born in this age of technological advance with up to six par-
ents.225 As children with just two legal parents often find them-
selves in the middle of lengthy custody disputes, 226 it is possible
that legal battling over children could become even more com-
plex and involved if courts granted legal parentage to more than
two individuals.227 However, as In re Baby M demonstrates,
228
zero sum tactics within a child's parentage probably meet nei-
ther the child's nor the parent's best interests.
229
B. Meeting Justiciability Requirements
Declaratory judgments may enable courts to adjudicate the
matter of a child's best interest quickly and conclusively.
230
However, the parties must first meet all the requisite tests of jus-
ticiability, and California courts would have to accord declara-
tory judgments preclusive effect .231
1. Death or Separation Before Adoption Is Finalized
For families who have either had a biological parent die or
who have contention between the biological and the step (or
second) parent before the adoption finalized, a declaratory
judgment might present a forceful tool of judicial reconcilia-
tion.232 Although the parents in Litowitz received a declaratory
judgment relatively early in the life of their child,233 it is not il-
logical to apply the same reasoning to later cases in which the
child has lived with a step or second parent for part of her life.
23 4
This argument proves more forceful the longer the child
lives with the step or second parent. The closer the attachment
to the non-biological parent, the more important conclusive pa-
224. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
225. See Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 84 (1993).
226. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1228-29 (N.J. 1988) (providing an example
of a custody dispute with a great deal of litigation).
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. The In re Baby M. court granted the surrogate mother visits with the child.
See id. at 1228-31.
230. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1086-90 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
231. See Hisserich, supra note 182, at 160.
232. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107,
111-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
233. See Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1086-89.
234. See id.
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rental determination becomes.235 In a situation where the bio-
logical parent has died, it would seem that another relative, or
even the state, could act as the child's guardian to satisfy justi-
ciability.236
As seen in Litowitz, 237 these cases also satisfy the require-
ments of standing: injury in fact, traceability to the defendant,
and likelihood of redress through favorable adjudication. 238 A
child taken from the only parent that she has ever known would
unquestionably suffer injury in fact.239 In addition, the child's
injury could be fairly traced to the action of the state or relative
challenging parentage. 240 Finally, there would be a great likeli-
hood that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision,
meaning that the child would not suffer injury if allowed to stay
in the home that satisfies her best interest.241
Neither mootness nor ripeness would present a justiciability
problem, as the individual rights of the child and the parents
would be at stake, in the midst of a live controversy.242 Hence,
the relative factual and legal issues as to where the child would
live would be mature.243 A declaratory judgment, if granted
preclusive effect, would give both the parent and child greater
stability.244 With a conclusive determination of parentage, sim-
ple family matters such as medical releases and permission slips
would not present a daunting task.245
2. Non-traditional Couples Wishing to Adopt
Non-traditional couples might also employ declaratory
judgments that would enable both partners to be legal parents
without future opposition.246 Standing could be more of a prob-
235. See Danny R. Veilleux, Necessity or Propriety of Appointment of Independent
Guardian for Child Who is Subject of Paternity Proceedings, 70 A.L.R. 4th 1033, 1033
(West 2001).
236. See id.
237. See Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1086-89.
238. See Pushaw, supra note 186, at 455-65.
239. See id. at 465.
240. See id. at 452.
241. See id. at 460.
242. See id.
243. See Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U. RIcH. L.
REV. 769, 770-80 (1998).
244. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1086-89 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
245. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS, 528-34 (1st ed. 1998).
246. See Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1087-89.,
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lem in such cases unless one member of the couple had already
adopted or given birth to the child.247 Proving that a couple try-
ing to adopt a child together have a live controversy sufficient to
overcome mootness may be difficult. Where one partner of a
couple already is a guardian of the child, it is somewhat easier to
assert that a controversy exists. Additionally, a child residing
with one parent and not the other could present a "case or con-
troversy" worthy of adjudication.248 The court could appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child through-
out the adoption proceeding.2 49 A dispute between the litigants
would exist, probably because current adoption law does not al-
low for a parent to adopt a partner's child absent marriage or
domestic partnership. 250
Like mootness, ripeness most likely would not present a
problem, as the issues presented are fit for judicial resolution, 251
and the child and parents would suffer hardship if the court did
not consider their plight.252 If the court decides to allow a de-
claratory action, as seen in Litowitz,253 then it would be impera-
tive that the action be given preclusive effect.
3. Greater than Two Biological Parents
Children with more than two biological parents might bene-
fit from each parent having some form of legal parentage over
them. In re Baby M, Calvert, Litowitz, Moschetta, and Buzzanca all
presented situations where, biologically speaking, more than
two parents contributed to the child's creation.254 Here, justicia-
bility most likely would not present a problem, unless the par-
ties came together without adversity.2 5 Even when there is a
minimal controvery, 256 Litowitz represents the possibility of a
247. There might be a problem with the issue being ripe, and thus the court
must be wary of issuing an advisory opinion if the child has not yet been born. See
Pushaw, supra note 186, at 455-65.
248. See Hisserich, supra note 182, at 160-62.
249. See Veilleux, supra note 235, at 1033.
250. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
251. See discussion supra Part II.
252. See Kannan, supra note 193, at 770-80.
253. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1086-89 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
254. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1228-29 (N.J. 1988); Johnson v. Calvert, 5
Cal. 4th 84 (1993); Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 934-39; In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280,
284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
255. See Pushaw, supra note 186, at 455-65.
256. See Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1086-90.
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court utilizing a declaratory judgment to conclusively solve the
issue of a child's parentage between the surrogate and biological
mother.257
V. PROPOSAL
Although AB-25 represents a colossal step forward in Cali-
fornia's ability to provide for all types of adoptive families, it
does not address the needs of every couple who wish to become
parents.258 Only a mechanism allowing adjudication on a case-
by-case basis could truly address the multifaceted and divergent
needs of all families in California;259 legislation necessarily takes
time as it winds through the different branches of govern-
ment.260 Adoptive families and children cannot afford to wait
while legislation is passed for their benefit. 261  Declaratory
judgments by the courts would give these families immediate
relief.262 However, post-Lortz, 263 the preclusive effect of declara-
tory judgments is not clear.264
The courts ought to use their discretionary authority265 with
regards to declaratory judgments to provide an "authoritative
judicial statement of legal relationships" for families that can
find recourse through no other branch of government.266 Spe-
cifically, courts could help make adoption run more smoothly
for non-traditional families by extending the twelve month time
period after which an adoption may not be challenged.2 67 The
courts should also have the ability to adjudicate prior to birth, so
as to solidify a child's living situation from the earliest moment
possible.268 By the same token, if a separating same-sex couple
did not finalize adoption proceedings before the legislation, ad-
ditional consideration ought to be granted by the courts in the
257. See id. at 934.
258. See discussion, supra Part II.
259. See Pushaw, supra note 186, at 455-65.
260. AB-25 took nearly two years, while the settlement in Litowitz happened be-
fore the baby was born. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6; Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1086-91.
261. Sharon has been both divisive and time consuming for all involved. See gen-
erally Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 107 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001).
262. See Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1086-91.
263. See Lortz v. Connell, 78 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
264. See id. at 15-16.
265. See Pushaw, supra note 186, at 455-65.
266. See Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1086-91.
267. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700 (West 1999).
268. See Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1086-91.
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interest of stability for the child.269
Considering that single adults may adopt children, the law
should not preclude a couple from adopting children simply be-
cause they did not get married or register as domestic part-
ners.270 As long as the couple can provide a child with a loving,
nurturing environment, it does not make sense to prohibit them
from being parents 271 solely because they choose not to legalize
their relationship with one another. The court could use a best
interest of the child test272 to resolve this problem.273 As with
heterosexual couples, this decision should not prohibit a same-
sex couple from acting as adoptive parents if they are able to
provide a nurturing living environment.2 74 Furthermore, parties
should make provisions so that they properly meet the require-
ments of justiciability. 275 For example, if a family brings a case
asking for resolution of their child's parental situation, and all
the parties are in agreement, then the case would not present
adversity sufficient to overcome mootness.276 Thus, the court
would find itself in danger of issuing an advisory opinion if it
rendered a decision.277 However, if the court allowed the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem or hospital to represent the
best interest of the child, then the requirements of justiciability
could be satisfied.278
Declaratory judgments with preclusive effect would enable
many non-traditional families to find the same type of familial
security endowed the Litowitzes.279 If it would be in the child's
best interest to recognize multiple biological parents, adoptive
parents, or some variation thereof, then the courts ought to ap-
ply the law accordingly.280 Assuming the court grants this type
of judgment, then it must be given preclusive effect in order to
269. Second parent adoption from AB-25 doesn't address this particular concern.
See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
270. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714 (West 2001).
271. See Vic Groze, Adoption and Single Parents: A Review, 70 CHILD WELFARE 321,
329-30 (1991).
272. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1228-1229 (N.J. 1998).
273. See Adoption of Michelle T., 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
274. See Groze, supra note 223.
275. See Pushaw, supra note 186, at 455-65.
276. See id. at 455.
277. See id.
278. See Veilleux, supra note 235.
279. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
280. This is the best interests test as seen in In re Baby M. See In re Baby M, 537
A.2d, 1227, 1227-32 (N.J. 1998).
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be meaningful. 281 For example, the court granted the surrogate
mother in In re Baby M visitation rights, but it is possible to
imagine a situation where she could be granted joint custody
with the baby's biological parents.282 Whatever new procedure
the court enacts, it needs to conserve both time and energy in
order to act in the best interests of the child. Even so, if the court
could limit the legal parentage to a relatively small number of
people as seen in the In re Baby M case, then a standard of more
than two legal parents might prove workable. 283 With a larger
pool of fit parents more children are adopted, benefiting both
the adoptive children and society at large.2 4 Ordinary events
can become problematic if parentage is not established. For ex-
ample, questions quickly arise as to who can authorize medical
treatment for a child, or consent to release from the hospital.285
Therefore, resolving issues of legal parentage at an early stage is
imperative. 286 Parents can use declaratory judgments to facili-
tate early resolution of parentage-a strongireason to incorporate
them into the realm of adoption law.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the passage of AB-25, California has shown its will-
ingness to circumvent societal mores in order to provide for its
adoptive children.287 Although AB-25 does enlarge the pool of
potential adoptive parents, it does not reach far enough.288 The
scope of adoption law ought to include any type of fit couple,
rather than any type of traditional couple.289 If a fit single parent
is allowed to adopt under the law of California, then logic re-
quires that a fit non-traditional couple should also be able to
adopt.290 In a society with continually changing sociology and
technology, it is unlikely that any single law or set of laws could
speak to the myriad of issues facing adoptive families today.291
281. See Hisserich, supra note 182, at 160-62.
282. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d, at 1228-29.
283. See id.
284. See discussion supra Part II.
285. See id.
286. See Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 94-95 (1993).
287. See AB-25, supra note 2, §§ 5-6.
288. See id.
289. See Groze, supra note 223, at 329-30.
290. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714 (West 2001).
291. See Garrison, supra note 119.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
In order to provide a more stable environment for the child, a
mechanism needs to be put in place that would allow a child's
parentage to be both diverse and secure. 292 Courts should em-
ploy declaratory judgments as it resolves parentage of children
in the most timely and effective manner.
Early resolution of parental disputes would help create se-
curity both for the parent and child.293 Although issues of dis-
puted biological parentage may not lend themselves to a judg-
ment before birth,294 they may lend themselves to early judicial
resolution after birth. For example, a non-married couple not
biologically related to their child could use a declaratory judg-
ment to ensure that they are the legal parents of a child. This
would prohibit the biological parents, or anyone else who
wanted to lay a claim to the child, from challenging their parent-
age at a later date.
Family law manifests a desire to protect the best interests of
the children.295 Consideration of the best interests of both adop-
tive children and the public at large dictates that the state should
make the pool of fit adoptive parents as large as possible. Stud-
ies show that children flourish in loving environments rather
than simply traditional environments.296 Thus, the standard for
parenthood ought to be based on the family environment itself
and whether it is both loving and nurturing.297
292. See discussion supra Part III.
293. See E. Gary Sptiko, Reclaiming the Creatures of the State: Contracting for Child
Custody Decision Making in the Best Interest of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1139, 1145-50 (2000).
294. As scientific evidence is complex, it might take a long time to work out the
details, even more so when more than the biological father is disputing the parent-
age. See Jill T. Phillips, Who Is My Daddy?: Using DNA to Help Resolve Post-Death Pa-
ternity Cases, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 151, 151 (1997).
295. See Garrison, supra note 119.
296. See Groze, supra note 222.
297. See id. at 330.
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